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Abstract 
Small scale enterprises receive several forms of aid, but many are denied access to 
loans from special microenterprise programs. A demand and supply model is estimated to 
analyze the factors lenders use to ration credit. Results reveal that suppliers favor long-term 
loans, profitable enterprises, and highly educated entrepreneurs. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Small scale rural and urban enterprises have been the concern of many policymakers 
attempting to accelerate the development process in low income countries. These enterpris-
es often receive several types of aid in the form of targeted credit programs, training and 
technical assistance (Levitsky). Many entrepreneurs report continual difficulties, however, 
in expanding their operations because of a lack of funds (Meyer, 1989). External finance 
is obtained by some through special microenterprise programs, while others are subject to 
credit rationing by these programs and they have difficulty in getting access to regular 
commercial loans. 
Credit rationing can be examined at two stages (Aguilera). The first stage is loan-
quantity rationing and the second is loan-size rationing. Loan-quantity rationing applies 
when lenders grant loans to a group of applicants who are identified as creditworthy 
borrowers, while rejecting another group as uncreditworthy. Loan-size rationing occurs 
when borrowers receive smaller loans than demanded. These two stages have also been 
identified as the incidence of rationing and the intensity of rationing (Lapar and Graham). 
Lenders make their loan decisions within regulatory constraints, such as interest rate 
ceilings, and based upon some observed characteristics of borrowers and their businesses. 
Lenders face problems of asymmetric information when trying to identify subsets of 
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borrowers. Financial contracts involve default risk because of adverse selection and moral 
hazard problems associated with the borrower's indeterminate type and unpredictable action 
(Stiglitz and Weiss). Interest rates are inadequate to bring about equilibrium in markets 
operating with imperfect information (Bester; Jaffee and Russell). To resolve asymmetric 
information problems and to identify creditworthy borrowers, lenders utilize non-price 
mechanisms based upon the characteristics of enterprises and entrepreneurs (Aguilera and 
Graham; Lapar and Graham). 
The model described in this paper was used to investigate credit rationing of lenders 
in special microenterprise programs in Ecuador. The objective is to evaluate the important 
factors used in loan-quantity rationing which result in some entrepreneurs being rejected in 
these targeted programs. The next section introduces the theoretical model used for 
evaluating this first stage of credit rationing. The third section describes the data used, and 
the results and implications are discussed in section 4. The last section presents the 
conclusions of the study. 
2. THE CREDIT RATIONING MODEL 
A framework for use in analyzing credit rationing requires consideration of the 
demand for and supply of loans, such as proposed by Aguilera and Graham. They argue 
that it is necessary to utilize a model including both demand and supply equations to 
determine conclusively whether credit use patterns represent supply side external rationing 
or internal self-selection by some types of borrowers. A single equation supply model could 
result in the misleading interpretation that lenders discriminate against a particular type of 
3 
borrower, while the estimation of the demand equation simultaneously could reveal that the 
borrowers self-select themselves. Thus, the model used in this paper involves a demand and 
supply simultaneous equations system and the criteria used by lenders to ration credit. 
It is assumed that special microenterprise programs provide entrepreneurs with loans 
at some exogenously established interest rate for each loan type. Due to asymmetric 
information, lenders employ non-price rationing mechanisms to determine the maximum 
loan amount they will grant each borrower, and reject some applications from borrowers and 
entrepreneurs that seem to be risky. The demand and supply equations can be presented 
as follows: 
(1) 
(2) 
where LD is loan demand; LS is the maximum amount that the lender is willing to offer 
given the state of knowledge about the applicant; r is the fixed interest rate charged for a 
particular loan type; X is a vector of independent explanatory variables; and u1 and u2 are 
random disturbances assumed to be independent of X. 
Basically, lenders select borrowers according to the following decision rule: 
LR = {LS If LS ~ W. 
0 lfLS<W 
(3) 
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where LR is the observed loan granted. Decision rule (3) presents a censored dependent 
variable where applicants under the condition LS ~ LD fall in the creditworthy borrower 
subgroup, while applicants where LS < LD fall in the rejected applicant subgroup. A 
similar general model is advanced by Nelson, where different cases are discussed depending 
on the available information on the latent endogenous variables. It is assumed that the 
random disturbances follow a bivariate normal distribution with a zero mean vector and 
unknown variances and covariance, (u12, u2 2, u12), and that both disturbances are independent 
across observations and of X. The formulation of the likelihood function requires the 
derivation of the distribution of LR from the joint distribution of u1 and u2• 
Assuming u1 and u2 to be independent, the likelihood function to be maximized as 
advanced by Nelson is: 
(4) 
. --
where no is the subset of rejected applicants and n1 is the subset granted loans. The data 
available from the survey is for LD and LR, i.e. LS is observed only when LS ~ LD. Nelson 
suggests that this case allows the separate estimation of equation (1) by OLS and equation 
(2) by Tobit analysis with no identification problems. For this study, however, we believe 
that maximum likelihood will yield more efficient results for the simultaneous equations 
system, so this is the estimation technique used given the information available (Maddala). 
The estimated loan demand equation is: 
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LD = ao + a1IR + ~IL + ¥$T + a4PRFf + asSTRT + a,,OW + a,NAGR + asLOC 
+ ¥DUC + a10SEX + a11AGE 
with the variables identified in Table 1. The loan supply equation is specified as: 
LS = b0 + b11R + b2MAT + b~T + b4PRFf + b5STRT + b60W + b,NAGR + b8LOC 
+ b9EDUC + b10SEX + b11AGE 
The demand and supply equations include interest rates (IR) to measure price 
elasticities, and several proxies to describe characteristics of enterprises and entrepreneurs 
believed to be considered by lenders in rationing credit. The demand equation includes 
informal loans (IL) to measure the degree of complementarity or substitutability between 
formal and informal loans; size of business, represented by value of total assets (AST), to 
measure the need for loans; profits (PRFf) reported for 1989 to indicate the ability of firms 
to self-finance their operations; agricultural or non-agricultural enterprises (NAGR) of 
production, commerce, and services to reflect the demand for loans in different sectors; 
years of experience of the entrepreneur (STRT) to indicate management capabilities; the 
type of ownership (OW) and some personal characteristics to indicate the type of applicant. 
The supply equation includes maturity of loans (MAT) to indicate the preference of lenders 
for maturity periods; size of the business (AST) to indicate ability to provide loan collateral 
or to liquidate assets to meet loan payments; profits (PRFf) to represent potential for loan 
repayment; agricultural or non-agricultural (NAGR) enterprises as a possible reflection of 
risk; past success of the entrepreneur as represented by the years of operating the business 
(STRT); the type of ownership (OW) and some personal characteristics such as education 
(EDUC), sex (SEX) and age (AGE), which may be additional indicators of business success 
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and creditworthiness. Geographic location (LOC) is introduced to determine if demand and 
supply differ in the coastal region versus the other regions of the country. 
3. THE MICROENTERPRISE SURVEY 
The data used in this study were obtained from a general survey of small scale 
enterprises conducted in Ecuador in 1990. It involved in-depth interviews with 625 entrepre-
neurs randomly selected participants in special microenterprise programs. A total of 248 
entrepreneurs requested credit during the year. Within this sub-set, 172 were granted loans 
while the rest were rejected and constitute the quantity rationed sub-group. Loans were 
extended between 60,000 sucres1 and 8,500,000 sucres, with interest rate charges ranging 
between 36% and 56% for borrowers granted loans for periods of 1 to 2 years. Loan 
demands were reported from a minimum of 100,000 sucres to a maximum of 15,000,000 
sucres. Informal loans recorded ranged between 10,000 and 2,000,000 sucres. The borrow-
ers were approximately equally distributed between the coastal and other regions, with 80% 
owned enterprises and about 40% representing female entrepreneurs. The majority of 
entrepreneurs (40%) were concentrated in production 25%, in commerce 24%, in services, 
and only 2.5% in agriculture. 
4. RESULTS AND IMPLICATIONS 
The results presented in Table 2 were generated from the maximum likelihood 
estimation of the demand and supply simultaneous equations system. The estimation shows 
1 Approximately 900 sucres = 1$. 
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acceptable R-squares for both equations in models using samples of cross-sectional data, and 
significant F-values. The demand equation produced an unexpected positive but insignifi-
cant interest rate (IR) coefficient. Interest rates have been negative in real terms in the past 
few years and at best bear a zero real rate at present. Under these circumstances, nominal 
interest rates may not function well to ration demand. 
Borrowers have larger loan demands with larger observed amounts of informal loans 
received (IL). Although this relationship is not significant, it may suggest that borrowers 
with large loan demand for microenterprise programs borrow from both formal and informal 
lenders. This result is analogous to the analysis provided by Meyer (1990) which suggests 
that informal loans for some borrowers are inferior to formal ones indicating substitution, 
while a number of entrepreneurs satisfy the terms and conditions for both sources and thus 
maintain a complimentary relationship between sources. 
The coefficients for both assets (AST) and profits (PRFT) are positively and signifi-
cantly related to loan demand. Assets as a proxy for size of business imply an increase in 
loan demand for larger enterprises. Profits may be a proxy for business success and 
repayment capacity so that profitable businesses encourage entrepreneurs to incur greater 
business risk through increased borrowing. This explanation seems to overwhelm the 
alternative explanation that profits are a proxy for capacity to self-finance. 
Several variables may influence the risk perception of the entrepreneur and loan 
demand. These include the number of years the business has been in operation (STRT) 
reflecting the entrepreneur's experience, the type of ownership of the business (OW), and 
sector (NAGR), which separates agricultural from non-agricultural enterprises. There is no 
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statistical significance between loan demand and age of business. Owners of businesses 
demand significantly larger loans than non-owners, and entrepreneurs operating non-
agricultural businesses also demand significantly larger loans than those in agriculture. 
Entrepreneurs in the coastal region (LOC), including Guayaquil, demand significantly 
smaller loan amounts than those in other regions including the capital of Quito. 
Highly educated entrepreneurs who hold high school diplomas and above seem to 
demand larger loans, and male entrepreneurs demand larger loans than female entrepre-
neurs. The negative but insignificant coefficient for age suggests that older entrepreneurs 
may demand smaller loans. 
As expected for the supply equation, the interest rate (IR) is positive and significant 
indicating that lenders are willing to supply larger loans with higher interest rates, perhaps 
because of the large transaction costs associated with small loans. Lenders are also more 
inclined to favor the disbursement of longer maturity loans which may also reflect an 
attempt to lower transaction costs. Surprisingly, assets (AST) is not a significant variable. 
This may be due to the fact that many microenterprise loans are made with cosigner 
guarantees rather than taking physical assets as collateral. Profits (PRFf), however, is a 
significant variable, perhaps implying that lenders evaluate profits as increased ability to 
repay loans. 
Almost all of the other factors that are included in the model to reflect lender's 
perception of creditworthiness are not significant, except for education. This may be due 
to the fact that special microenterprise programs are developed precisely to channel funds 
to entrepreneurs excluded in commercial lending. Lenders evaluate higher education as a 
9 
positive factor in determining loan size and this gives holders of high school degrees and 
above more access to credit from the special microenterprise program. An important 
contrast stands out in Table 2 between demand effects and supply effects of ownership, 
sector, location, and sex. In effect, it is not that owners, non-agricultural entrepreneurs, and 
male entrepreneurs are favored by the lender, but rather that these borrowers tend to 
demand larger loans. Likewise, older entrepreneurs and those from the coastal region are 
not being subject to credit rationing; these borrowers demand less than young entrepreneurs 
and those from other regions. Finally, even though it is often believed that lenders discrimi-
nate against female entrepreneurs, the variable for gender (SEX) is positive but insignifi-
cant. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
The credit rationing model specified in this paper highlights the importance of 
separating loan demand effects from loan supply effects. The demand function suggests that 
larger assets and profits, and higher levels of education are associated with larger demand 
for loans. Male entrepreneurs, owners of enterprises and entrepreneurs in non-agricultural 
sectors also demand larger loans. As expected, the supply function implies that lenders 
grant larger loans at higher interest rates and favor longer-term loans. Larger loan supplies 
are also associated with higher profits and levels of education. Discrimination against 
female entrepreneurs does not seem to exist contrary to popular belief, but it appears that 
females demand smaller loans than male borrowers. Similarly, enterprises in the agricultur-
al sector, located in the coastal region, operated by non-owners, and managed by less 
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experienced entrepreneurs receive smaller loans because they demand less and not because 
they have been discriminated against. These results are important because they show that 
if small scale enterprises are perceived as being profitable and entrepreneurs are willing to 
pay higher interest rates, they have a good chance of getting loans from a special micro-
enterprise program. 
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TABLE 1 DEFINITION OF VARIABLES 
VARIABLE 
LD 
LS 
IR 
MAT 
IL 
AST 
PRFT 
STRT 
ow 
NAGR 
LOC 
EDUC 
SEX 
AGE 
DESCRIPTION 
Amount of Credit Demanded a 
Amount of Loan Granted a 
Nominal Interest Rate in Percent 
Loan Period in Months 
Informal Loan Amount Observed a 
Value of Assets Reported. a 
Amount of Profits for 1989 a 
Number of Years in Business 
Ownership Dummy Variable= 1 Owner 
Sector Dummy Variable=! Non-Agriculture 
Location Dummy Variable= 1 Coastal Region 
Education Dummy Variable= 1 High School Level or Above 
Gender Dummy Variable= 1 Male 
Number of Years of Entrepreneur's Age 
a All values are in sucres. 
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TABLE 2 RESULTS OF THE LOAN-QUANTITY RATIONING MODEL 
Maximum Likelihood Estimation Coefficients 
Demand 
Variable 
IR 
MAT 
IL 
AST 
PRFT 
STRT 
ow 
NAGR 
LOC 
EDUC 
SEX 
AGE 
R2 
F-Value 
N = 248 Observations 
Coefficient 
6,080.69 
0.01 
0.14 
2.23 
-25,353.38 
509,177.95 
984,044.50 
-782,009.75 
415,348.57 
502,843.08 
-11,061.86 
0.22 
6.03*"* 
* * * Significant at 1 percent level 
* * Significant at 5 percent level 
* Significant at 10 percent level 
T-Ratio 
0.93 
0.07 
4.25*** 
2.04** 
-0.73 
1.56* 
2.13** 
-2.99** 
1.51 * 
1.86* 
-0.86 
Supply 
Coefficient T-Ratio 
8,009.50 3.18*** 
11,435.38 2.43** 
0.01 -0.34 
0.75 2.19** 
9,051.96 0.82 
28,746.95 0.28 
33,367.17 0.23 
-41,751.62 -0.50 
168,641.96 1.96** 
45,161.66 0.53 
-3,083.99 -0.72 
0.19 
5.28*** 
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